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NOTES
RECENT LEGISLATIVE CHANGES IN THE
CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS OF THE
UNITED STATES TAX COURT
AND THE COURTS OF THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the adoption of the Constitution, numerous suits have chal-
lenged the constitutional status of various courts of the United States.
These suits were important in restricting the power of Congress to
limit the tenure or reduce the salary of judges, to limit the reviewabil-
ity and validity of court decisions, and to provide for the assignment
of judges between courts. The distinctions drawn by the Congress
and the Supreme Court between those courts termed "article I" courts
and those termed "article I" courts have had an effect on the doctrine
of separation of powers and on the type of court system in the United
States today.
This note will examine two recent federal legislative developments
which affect the constitutional status of the United States Tax Court
and the various courts of the District of Columbia. These legisla-
tive enactments are the Tax Reform Act of 1969 and the District of Co-
lumbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970.'
I1. LEGISLATIVE VERSUS CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS
The status of a court is determined by whether its powers are granted
under article I or by Congress by authority of another article of the
Constitution. Article I provides that:
The judicial power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme
court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time
ordain and establish. 2
I. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487; District of Colum-
bia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-358, 84 Stat.
473 (hereinafter Title I of this Act will be referred to as the Court Reorganization
Act, which is codified in D.C. CODE ANN. Title 11).
2. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
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Courts established under article III are termed "article H1" or "con-
stitutional" courts.3  These include the Supreme Court, the circuit
courts of appeals, and the district courts. To implement the forma-
tion of constitutional courts, Congress is granted the power "to con-
stitute tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court." This power, however,
is limited only to inferior courts established under article III; that is,
courts other than the Supreme Court.4  Article III also limits the ju-
dicial power of constitutional courts to only those matters termed "cases
and controversies," thereby prohibiting these courts from rendering
advisory opinions or decisions on moot questions.'
Article III does not encompass the entire "court-making" power
however. Article IV' gives Congress power to create courts in the ter-
ritories7 and article I gives Congress the power to create courts to as-
sist Congress in carrying out its required duties. 8 The courts which
are created under a constitutional power other than article iM are
termed "legislative" courts. 9 The first case acknowledging the exis-
tence and delineating the powers of legislative courts was American
3. For a history of constitutional courts, see Surrency, A History of Federal
Courts, 28 Mo. L. REv. 214 (1963).
4. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. It is generally recognized that article I, § 8 refers
only to the inferior courts also referred to in article III; that is, article I, § 8 does
not give Congress a separate power apart from article III to create inferior courts.
See, e.g., Glidden v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 543 (1962); 2 J. STORY, COMMEN-
TARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION §1579 (5th ed. 1891).
5. See generally C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF FEDERAL COURTS H8
12-15 (2d ed. 1970).
6. U.S. CONST. art. 1V, § 3, cl. 2:
The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful rules
and regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the
United States; and nothing in this Constitution shall be so construed as to
Prejudice any Claims of the United States, or of any particular State.
7. For a history of the territorial courts, see Blume & Brown, Territorial
Courts and Law, 61 MicH. L. REv. 39, 467 (1962).
8. In Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438 (1929), the Supreme Court stated that
"other Articles invest Congress with powers in the exertion of which it may create
inferior courts and clothe them with functions deemed essential or helpful in carrying
those powers into execution." Id. at 449.
9. For a discussion of legislative courts, see generally 1 J. MOORE, FEDERAL
PRAclIcE 0.4 (2d ed. 1972); Cassin, Constitutional Versus Legislative Courts, 16
FORDHAM L. Rv. 87 (1947); Katz, Federal Legislative Courts, 43 HARv. L. REv. 894
(1930); Watson, The Concept of the Legislative Court, 10 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 799
(1942); Note, The Distinction Between Legislative and Constitutional Courts and
Its Effects on Judicial Assignment, 62 COLuM. L. REV. 133 (1961); Note, Constitu-
tional Law : Federal Courts, 49 CORNELL L.Q. 122 (1963).
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Insurance Company v. Canter.10 This case involved a collateral attack
on a salvage decree of a federal court created in the Florida Territory
with the judges appointed for only four year terms. Chief Justice
Marshall rejected the argument that Congress could not create courts
with judges of limited tenure and stated:
These Courts, then, are not constitutional courts, in which the judicial
power conferred by the Constitution on the general government, can be
deposited. They are incapable of receiving it. They are legislative
Courts, created in virtue of the general right of sovereignty which exists
in the government, or in virtue of that clause which enables Congress to
make all needful rules and regulations, respecting the territory belonging
to the United States: The jurisdiction with which they are invested, is
not a part of that judicial power which is defined in the 3d article of the
Constitution, but is conferred by Congress, in the execution of those
general powers which that body possesses over the territories of the
United States.1 '
Although several other cases have upheld the validity of legislative
courts," the major decision expanding the concept of the legislative
court is Ex parte Bakelite Corporation.'3  This case came before the
Supreme Court on a petition for a writ of prohibition which necessi-
tated a determination whether the Court of Customs Appeals could
hear an appeal from the findings of a Tariff Commission proceeding.
The Court of Customs Appeals was not deciding a "case or contro-
versy" within the meaning of article IIl because the Tariff Act of
1922 allowed the President to overrule the Tariff Commission, thereby
disabling the Court of Customs Appeals from rendering a final and en-
10. 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1828).
I. hi. at 546. This statement forms the basis for the concept of the legislative
courts. With regard to territorial courts, their designation as legislative courts would
seem to be required by the practical consideration of having inferior courts in these lo-
calities with judges holding only limited tenure, since statehood and a state court
system would soon be developed in the territories. See Katz, Federal Legislative
Count . 43 HARV. L. REV. 894, 902 (1930).
12, Wallace v. Adams, 204 U.S. 415 (1907) (upholding the validity of the Choctaw
and Chickasaw citizenship court, created to determine membership in the two Indian
tribes so as to distribute lands and funds held in trust by the federal government);
United States v. Coe, 155 U.S. 76 (1894) (upholding the validity of the Court of Pri-
vate Land Claims, which was created by Congress by virtue of its power over the
fulfillment of treaty obligations to hear and determine claims founded on Spanish or
Mexican grants). See Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 451 (1929) (discussing
the United States Court for China and consular courts, created by Congress to exercise
jurisdiction over American citizens in foreign lands).
13. 279 U.S. 438 (1929).
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forceable decree.14  Accordingly, even though the judges of the Court
of Customs Appeals held tenure for life,' the Supreme Court held that
the court was a legislative court "created by Congress in virtue of its
power to lay and collect duties on imports and to adopt any appropri-
ate means of carrying that power into execution."'" According to the
decision, Congress had the power to establish, for non-territorial pur-
poses, legislative courts capable of deciding suits that were not cases
or controversies. The Court stated:
Legislative courts also may be created as special tribunals to examine
and determine various matters, between the government and others,
which from their nature do not require judicial determination and yet
are susceptible of it. The mode of determining matters of this class is
completely within congressional control. Congress may reserve to itself
the power to decide, may delegate that power to executive officers, or
may commit it to judicial tribunals.' 7
The Court in Bakelite rejected the use of congressional intent as the
only test to determine status. Instead, the Court declared that "the true
test lies in the power under which the court was created and in the
jurisdiction conferred."' Following this test the Court held four years
later in Williams v. United States'9 that the Court of Claims was not
an article II court, since the "power under which the court was cre-
ated" originated within article I, section 8 of the Constitution.
The trend towards a broad view of legislative, non-territorial courts
14. Tariff Act of 1922, ch. 356, § 316, 42 Stat. 858, 943.
15. 279 U.S. at 459.
16. Id. at 458.
17. Id. at 451. This statement formed one of the tests used by Judge Drennan in
Bums, Stix Friedman & Co. v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 392 (1971), in holding that
the Tax Court is a legislative court.
18. 279 U.S. at 459. Congress could not therefore merely state that a court is es-
tablished under article 11I in order to make it a constitutional court-Congress would
also have to vest the court with the powers and jurisdiction of a constitutional court,
whatever those powers or jurisdiction may be.
The Court in Bakelite also stated that special provisions for lifetime tenure and un-
diminished salary are not necessary to establish a constitutional court. If the court is
a constitutional court, then the absence or presence of any tenure or salary provision
will not have any effect. Id. at 459.
19. 289 U.S. 553 (1933). The decision in Williams was significant because tho
Court found that the Court of Claims had not limited its jurisdiction to cases and
controversies. The Supreme Court interpreted the language of article III, section 2 of
the Constitution, "controversies to which the United States shall be a party," to
mean a party plaintiff alone, and that a suit is not a controversy where the United
States is a party defendant. Id. at 571-78.
['Vol. 1973:381
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was curtailed in the cases following Bakelite and Williams.2 1 In Glid-
den v. Zdanok 1 the petitioner brought suit attacking the validity of a
Second Circuit Court of Appeals judgment in which Judge Madden of
the Court of Claims, sitting by designation,2 2 participated. The peti-
tioner alleged that the assignment of a legislative court judge to sit on a
constitutional court was impermissible and rendered the judgment in-
valid. Although the Supreme Court in Williams had held that the
Court of Claims was an article I court, the Supreme Court here held
that the participation of Judge Madden did not vitiate the judgment.23
The Court did not, however, reach the question of the effect of the par-
ticipation of article I judges on article III courts. Instead, they held
the Court of Claims to be an article III court. Mr. Justice Harlan,
joined by two other justices, stated that the Court of Claims had al-
ways been an article III court, thus rejecting Bakelite and Williams.24
Mr. Justice Clark, joined by Chief Justice Warren, concurred in the
finding that the Court of Claims was now an article III court, but
would not overrule Bakelite or Williams.2 1  Mr. Justice Clark took
the position that the Bakelite and Williams decisions were correct when
rendered, but no longer controlling because of the 1958 legislation26
declaring the Court of Claims to be an article III court. Mr. Justice
Douglas, joined by Justice Black in dissent, also would not overrule
20. Although the trend was curtailed, the distinction between legislative and consti-
tutional courts survived. See, e.g., Nash Miami Motors, Inc. v. Commissioner, 358 F.2d
636 (5th Cir. 1966), where the court rejected the taxpayer's contention that the distinc-
tion between legislative and constitutional courts had been overruled by Glidden.
21 370 U.S. 530 (1962). Lurk v. United States was a companion case decided in
the same opinion. In Lurk, a retired judge of the Court of Customs and Patent Ap-
peals, sitting by similar designation, presided over a robbery trial in a federal district
court. The court held, as in Glidden, that the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
was an article III court.
22. The Chief Justice was given authority under 28 U.S.C. § 293(a) (1970) to
"assign temporarily any judge of the Court of Claims or the Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals . . . to perform judicial duties in any circuit, either in a court of ap-
peals or district court, upon presentation of a certificate of necessity by the chief
judge or circuit justice of the circuit wherein the need arises."
23. 370 U.S. 530, 584 (1962).
24, Id. at 552. The test employed by Harlan to determine whether the court was
created under article III was whether the "establishing legislation complies with the
limitation of that article: whether, in other words, its business is the federal business
there specified and its judges and judgments are allowed the independence there ex-
pressly or impliedly made requisite."
25. Id. at 585.
26. 28 U.S.C. § 211 (1970) (originally enacted as Act of August 25, 1958, § 1,
72 Stat. 848).
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Bakelite or Williams, but he also would not allow Congress to change
the status of the Court of Claims since he felt that judges of article I
and article III courts were not "fungible" and that a judge chosen for
an article I court might not have the qualifications required of a judge
sitting on an article III court.17
The Court in Glidden was, nevertheless, consistent with Bakelite in
rejecting a test based solely on congressional intent."' From an
analysis of the opinions in Glidden it becomes apparent that for a court
to be held a constitutional court the following criteria must be met:
(1) that Congress intends the court to have article III status; 20 (2)
that the court be primarily concerned with "cases and controversies";30
(3) that the court function in the traditional manner of a court;3 ' and
(4) that the term of office of judges be for life and that their salaries
be free from diminution. 32
Other commenators have condensed the four criteria emanating from
Glidden into two basic functional differences between legislative and
constitutional courts.33  First, pursuant to the explicit mandate of arti-
27. 370 U.S. at 599.
28. Id. at 541:
In determining the constitutional character of the Court of Claims and the
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, as we are thus led to do, we may not
disregard Congress's declaration that they were created under article III. Of
course, Congress may not by fiat overturn the constitutional decision of this
court ....
29. See note 28 supra.
30. 370 U.S. at 579. Some insignificant amount of judicial business not consid-
ered to be cases or controversies may be allowed. The Court of Claims was granted
congressional reference jurisdiction by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1492 and 2509 (1970). At that
time Congress made an average of ten legislative references to the Court of Claims
each year. Id. at 587.
The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals held authority under 28 U.S.C. § 1543
(1970) to review Tariff Commission findings of unfair practices in import trade.
Since the Bakelite decision, however, this court has handled only four congressional
references of an advisory nature and only one in the last twenty-seven years. Id.
at 588.
31. Id. at 572. By "functioning in the traditional means of a court," Harlan may
have intended that the court function under rules of evidence and procedure and oper-
ate in an adversary proceeding.
32. Id. at 534.
33. See, e.g., Katz, Federal Legislative Courts, 43 HARv. L. Rv. 894, 895 (1930).
To determine whether the court is a legislative or constitutional court in the first
place, commentators look at various other differences that have been important at one
time or another. For example, location of the courts, in the territories or outside any
state, has been cited as another difference between legislative and constitutional courts.
See Watson, The Concept of the Legislative Court, 10 Gno. WASH. L. REV. 799 (1942);
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1973/iss2/3
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cle III, judges of constitutional courts must have lifelong tenure and
their salaries may not be diminished. In comparison, the judges of leg-
islative courts are not afforded such constitutional protection. The
policy usually articulated for this provision is to assure an independent
judiciary." Secondly, legislative courts are not bounded with the limi-
tations pertaining to constitutional courts, such as the case or contro-
versy limitation, and may therefore render advisory opinions.
The distinctions between legislative and constitutional courts are not
purely academic. There are some practical considerations that make
this distinction important. One such consideration is whether judges
of legislative courts may be assigned to constitutional courts, 5 thus lim-
iting the efficient utilization of federal judges.36 If this limitation is
ignored, the result might be the vitiation of a constitutional court's de-
cision. A second important consideration lies in the power of legisla-
tive courts to render advisory opinions. Congress on a number of oc-
casions has relied upon the assistance rendered by legislative courts in
giving advisory opinions or performing legislative tasks.37  Without
legislative courts Congress would be forced to find a substitute forum
in the legislative or executive branches. Another consideration lies in
the concept of separation of power.38 To maintain closer control over
certain courts, such as the Tax Court and the Court of Military Appeals,
Congress has limited the tenure of its judges. Depending on one's
concept of the ideal relationship between the judiciary and the other
Note, The Distinction Between Legislative and Constitutional Courts and Its Effect
on Judicial Asskgnment, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 133, 138 (1962).
34. See O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516, 535 (1933); THE FEDERALIST
Nos. 80. 81, 82 (A. Hamilton); Note, The Distinction Between Legislative and
Contitutional Courts and Its Effect on Judicial Assignment, 62 COLUM. L. REV.
133, 149 (1961).
35, See Glidden v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962).
36. The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court was given authority under 28 U.S.C.
293(a) (1970) to make efficient use of judges of the Court of Claims and Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals. See note 22 supra.
37. Congress, acting under article I, has from time to time vested administrative
and even legislative powers in the courts of the District. See, e.g., Federal Radio
Commission v. General Electric Co., 281 U.S. 464, 467-68 (1930) (review of radio
station licensing); Postum Cereal Co. v. California Fig Nut Co., 272 U.S. 693,
698-701 (1926) (patent and trademark appeals); Keller v. Potomac Electric Power Co.,
261 U.S. 428, 440-43 (1923) (review of ratemaking). In addition, Congress had
given authority to District Court judges to appoint members of the Board of Educa-
tion. Act of June 20, 1906, ch. 3446, § 2, 34 Stat. 316.
38. For a general discussion of the concept of separation of powers, see Note,
Constitutional Law: Federal Courts, 49 CORNELL L.Q. 122, 132 (1963).
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branches of government, this may result in a lack of judicial indepen-
dence or in a greater accountability of judges to Congress.
Recently Congress has passed the Tax Reform Act of 1969 and the
District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of
1970. Both pieces of legislation deal extensively with the constitu-
tional status of federal courts. This note will examine the effect of
this legislation on the status of the Tax Court and the Courts of the
District of Columbia and will further examine any shortcomings of the
legislation in providing for the independence of these courts.
m11. THE UNITED STATES TAX COURT
A. History of the Tax Court
In the Revenue Act of 1918, 39 Congress established an Advisory
Tax Board to review questions of interpretation and administration
of the tax laws. In the Revenue Act of 1924,40 Congress expanded
the function of the board and replaced it with the Board of Tax Ap-
peals." Under the 1924 Act there was no appeal from a decision of
the Board of Tax Appeals. The only remedy to the taxpayer upon
losing his case was to pay the tax and bring suit for a refund in a
District Court or the Court of Claims, where the trial would be held de
novo.42 To eliminate unnecessary and expensive duplication of pro-
cedure, Congress, in the Revenue Act of 1926,13 made the decision of
the board final and reviewable by the various circuit courts of appeals."4
39. Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 1301, 40 Stat. 1140-41.
40. Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 900(a), 43 Stat. 336.
41. For an analysis of the reasons underlying the creation of the Board of Tax
Appeals, see Flora v. United States, 362 U.S. 145 (1960); Henke, The Tax Court, The
Proposed Administrative Court, and Judicialization, 18 BAYLOR L. REv. 449, 450-52
(1966).
For an early account of the origins of the Board of Tax Appeals, see C. HAMEL,
PRACTiCE AND EVIDENCE BEFORE THm UNtED STATES BoAIw OF TAX APP Ls (1938).
For later histories of the Board and the Tax Court, see 9 J. MERTENS, LAW Ov FEDERAL
INcoME TAxATION § 50.02 (J. Malone ed. 1972); Ferguson, Jurisdictional Problems in
Federal Tax Controversies, 48 IowA L. REv. 312, 350-56 (1963); Henke, The Tax
Court, The Proposed Administrative Court, and Judicialization, 18 BAYLOR L. Rnv.
449 (1966); Note, Procedural and Administrative Changes in the Tax Court Created by
the Tax Reform Act of 1969, 8 HOUSTON L. REv. 395, 396-98 (1970).
42. Garden City Feeder Co. v. Commissioner, 27 B.T.A. 1132, 1140 (1933),
rev'd on other grounds, 75 F.2d 804 (8th Cir. 1935), rehearing, 35 B.T.A. 770 (1937).
43. Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 1001, 44 Stat. 109.
44. The 1926 Act made a number of changes in the Board that indicated the
Board's judicial nature. The 1926 Act ordered the Board to follow judicial procedures.
[2Vol. 1973:381
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The taxpayer was not restricted to this forum, for he could always pay
the disputed tax and then sue for a refund in a federal district court.45
The advantage of using the Board of Tax Appeals as a forum for tax
litigation was that prepayment of the taxes was not required.4 Once
the taxpayer elected to bring suit before the Board, however, he was
precluded from bringing suit in any other court. In other words, the
Board of Tax Appeals had exclusive control once its jurisdiction was
invoked.4 7
The 1939 Code"5 designated the Board of Tax Appeals an inde-
pendent agency within the executive branch even though its functions
were entirely judicial. 9 In the Revenue Act of 194250 Congress
changed the title of the Board to the Tax Court of the United States and
designated that the members of the court were to be known as
"judges." n' Nevertheless, the 1939 Code 2 and the 1954 Code 53 con-
tinued to refer to the Tax Court as an agency within the executive
branch, though numerous court decisions54 and congressional reports55
See eenerally Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, §§ 900, 901, 44 Stat. 105-06. Even though
the Committee Report referred to the Board's jurisdiction as judicial, see 9 J. MERTENS,
LAW or FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 50.03 n.27 (J. Malone ed. 1972), the Board was
termed "an independent agency in the Executive Branch of the Government." Revenue
Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 900(k), 43 Stat. 338.
45. See. e.g., Fox v. Rothensies, 115 F.2d 42 (3d Cir. 1940).
46. This distinction continues to the present day. The district court and Court of
Claims require prepayment of taxes before a suit for refund is allowed, whereas the
Tax Court does not allow such prepayment. This distinction is often the deciding
factor in the taxpayer's choice of forum, and has resulted in the Tax Court being
called the "poor man's" tax court. See generally L. Knm & D. ARGUE, TAX COURT
PRAcTICE 10-35 (4th ed. 1970).
47. INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, ch. 1, § 322(c), 53 Stat. 92. Section 6512(a) of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954 also provides that the Tax Court obtains exclusive juris-
diction the very moment a petition for review of a tax deficiency is filed with it, and the
forum thereafter cannot be changed. See Thompson v. United States, 308 F.2d 628, 634
(1962).
48. INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, ch. 5, § 1100, 53 Stat. 158.
49. Se- note 54 infra.
50. Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619, § 504(a), 56 Stat. 957.
51. For a discussion of the Revenue Act of 1942 and the controversy sur-
rounding the Tax Court's continued designation as an independent agency within the
executive branch while being termed a court, see Gribbon, Should the Judicial Charac-
ter of the Tax Court be Recognized, 24 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 619 (1956).
52. See note 48 supra.
53. Act of Aug. 16, 1954, ch. 76, § 7441, 68A Stat. 879.
54. The one Supreme Court decision continually cited to show that the Board of
Tax Appeals and hence the Tax Court is but an agency of the executive department is
Old Colony Trust Company v. United States, 279 U.S. 716 (1929). But this case was
Washington University Open Scholarship
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termed the Tax Court a judicial court and not an executive agency.
Congress in the Tax Reform Act of 1969 attempted to resolve any
dispute as to the status of the Tax Court by changing its status from
that of an executive agency to an article I court."' While previ-
ously there had been a question as to whether the Tax Court was an
executive agency or judicial court, the question now is whether the Tax
Court is an article I or an article III court.
B. The Status of the Tax Court Under the 1969 Tax Reform Act
The criteria of Glidden is now the accepted authority to determine
whether a court is an article I or an article I court, 7 and will be used
here to examine the status of the Tax Court. First, the intent of Con-
gress in the 1969 Tax Reform Act is to establish the Tax Court as an
article I court. Section 951 states:
decided around the time that the 1926 Act was passed, and is better cited to show
that the Tax Court functions are strictly judicial in nature. A number of courts of
appeals have declared that the Tax Court functions as a court with only judicial powers
and had never been given any administrative powers. See, e.g., Kenner v. Commis-
sioner, 387 F.2d 689 (7th Cir. 1968); Reo Motors v. Commissioner, 219 F.2d 610
(6th Cir. 1955); Stern v. Commissioner, 215 F.2d 701 (3d Cir. 1954). But see the
following courts of appeals decisions where the judicial function of the Tax Court was
recognized, yet the court of appeals insisted on terming the Tax Court an agency of
the executive branch: Nash Miami Motors, Inc. v. Commissioner, 358 F.2d 636
(5th Cir. 1966); Martin v. Commissioner, 358 F.2d 63 (7th Cir. 1966); Lasky v.
Commissioner, 235 F.2d 97 (9th Cir. 1956).
The Tax Court itself viewed its function as strictly judicial, whatever the label
placed on the court. See, e.g., Fairmount Aluminum Company v. Commissioner, 22
T.C. 1377, 1384-85 (1954), where the court lists numerous congressional reports and
hearings indicating the judicial nature of the Tax Court.
55. Even though the legislative history of the 1942 Act does not explain why the
Tax Court was designated an independent agency in the executive branch, the hearings
concerning the Revised Judicial Code in 1948 indicated the contrary congressional
opinion on whether the Tax Court should become a court of record. Hearings on H.R.
3214 Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 80th Cong., 2d
Sess. 3214 (1948). In the original bill as passed through the House, the Tax Court
was designated a court of record, but the Senate Committee on the Judiciary deleted
the court of record provision.
56. The petitioner in Burns, Stix Friedman & Co., see notes 73-76 infra and ac-
companying text, abandoned his argument that the transfer of the Tax Court from an
independent agency in the executive department to a court of record under article I is
a transfer without due process of law. The court in Burns stated that "the due process
argument appears to have been disposed of by Cheatham v. United States, 92 U.S. 85,
Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589, Willmut Gas & Oil Co. v. Fly, 322 F.2d 301,
and other cases." 57 T.C. 392 n.4 (1971).
57. See, e.g., Nash Miami Motors, Inc. v. Commissioner, 358 F.2d 636 (5th Cir.
1966.).
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There is hereby established, under article I of the Constitution of the
United States, a court of record to be known as the United States Tax
Court.58
Congressional intent alone, however, is not in itself sufficient to es-
tablish the status of a court.59 That the Tax Court judges are neither
granted lifetime tenure 0 nor guaranteed undiminished salary"' also
supports the analysis that it is an article I court.
The Tax Court, however, has several article I attributes. It han-
dles only those matters termed "cases and controversies"' 2 and func-
tions only in the traditional manner of a court.63 Further, the Tax
58. Tax Reform Act of 1969, § 951, INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7441.
59. See note 28 supra. The major cases brought before the Supreme Court, such
as Bakelite and Glidden, have involved courts declared to be article I courts by stat-
ute, or in which the contention has been that the courts are article Ill courts. There-
fore, the intention-of-Congress test used in those cases may function differently when
the intent of Congress is to create an article I court.
60. Tenure for judges is fifteen years, Tax Reform Act of 1969 § 952, INT. REv.
CODE OF 1954, § 7443(e); and judges must retire at age seventy, Tax Reform Act of
1969 954, INr. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 7447(b). The provisions for removal of
judges are limited, INt. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7443(f):
(f) Removal from office-Judges of the Tax Court may be removed by the
President, after notice and opportunity for public hearing, for inefficiency,
neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office, but for no other cause.
But this standard is not identical to the provision in the Constitution for judges of
article III courts, U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 1:
The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior courts, shall hold their offices
during good behavior ....
Even though tenure is limited to fifteen years, all judges are appointed automatically
for additional terms if the judge so desires. See Gribbon, Should the Judicial Charac-
ter of the Tax Court be Recognized?, 24 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 619 n.31 (1956). There-
fore, the term of office of Tax Court judges may not be significantly different than
that of federal district court judges who retire at age seventy.
61. The salary of Tax Court judges is tied to the identical salary as that of a fed-
eral district court judge, Tax Reform Act of 1969 § 953, INT. REv. CODE OF 1954,
§ 74 4 3(c), but Congress could repeal the identical salary provision and reduce Tax
Court judges' salaries.
62. See Stem v. Commissioner, 215 F.2d 701, 707 (3d Cir. 1954); Fairmount
Aluminum Company v. Commissioner, 22 T.C. 1377 (1954), where it has been held
that the Tax Court has never had administrative, investigative or regulatory func-
tions. See also 9 J. MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 50.03 (J.
Malone ed. 1972).
Congress has clearly expressed a purpose to bestow judicial, as distinguished from
administrative, functions on the Tax Court. H.R. REP. No. 2, 70th Cong., 1st Sess.
31 (1927); S. REP. No. 960, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. 38 (1927).
63. The federal circuit courts of appeals have ruled that the Tax Court functions
only in a traditional judicial manner. Kenner v. Commissioner, 387 F.2d 689 (7th
Cir. 1968); Nash Miami Motors, Inc. v. Commissioner, 358 F.2d 636 (5th Cir. 1966);
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Court now operates under the same judicial review standard as other
federal courts which handle tax matters.64 Nevertheless, under the
Glidden criteria it appears that the Tax Court is a legislative and not a
constitutional court.
The policies articulated in the legislative history for giving the Tax
Court article I status indicate a desire on the part of Congress to up-
grade the effectiveness65 of the Tax Court and to improve its image as
an impartial tribunal. To accomplish this, Congress first eliminated the
Martin v. Commissioner, 358 F.2d 63 (7th Cir. 1966); Reo Motors, Inc. v. Commis-
sioner, 219 F.2d 610 (6th Cir. 1955); Stem v. Commissioner, 215 F.2d 701 (3d Cir.
1954). Cf. Lasky v. Commissioner, 235 F.2d 97 (9th Cir. 1956), where the opinion
stressed the quasi-judicial nature of the Tax Court. See generally Brown, The Nature of
the Tax Court of the United States, 10 U. PrTr. L. REV. 298 (1949); Ginsberg, Is the
Tax Court Constitutional?, 35 Miss. L.J 382 (1964); Gribbon, Should the Judicial
Character of the Tax Court Be Recognized?, 24 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 619 (1956);
Henke, The Tax Court, The Proposed Administrative Court, and Judicialization, 18
BAYLOR L. RayV. 449 (1966). It is true that the jurisdiction of the Tax Court is limited
by Congress in the Internal Revenue Code, see generally 9 J. MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL
INCOME TAXATION, §§ 50.07, 50.08 (J. Malone ed. 1972), but Congress may also limit
the jurisdiction of article III courts. See Glidden v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 551-52, 567-
68 (1962). The Tax Court has no equity function, see Commissioner v. Gooch Milling
& Elevator Co., 320 U.S. 418 (1943); Jefferson Loan Co. v. Commissioner, 249 F.2d
364 (8th Cir. 1957), and operates under specific rules of procedure and evidence. See
generally 9 J. MERTENS, supra, § 50.
64. In Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 489 (1943), the Supreme Court at-
tempted to grant the Tax Court a greater status in interpreting the Internal Revenue
Code than that accorded to federal district courts since the Tax Court was a special-
ized administrative body of "experts." Congress overruled this doctrine in the Revenue
Act of 1948, § 36, 62 Stat. 991, amending the Internal Revenue Code of 1939,
§ 1141(a), to give the identical scope of review to the Tax Court as is given to district
court decisions. The intention of Congress was to treat the Tax Court as any other
federal court. See S. REP. No. 1559, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, 13 (1948).
In addition, following its decision in Golsen v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 742 (1970),
the Tax Court now functions as any other district court with regard to its relationship
to the various courts of appeal. Prior to Golsen, in Lawrence v. Commissioner, 27
T.C. 713 (1957), the Tax Court viewed its function as to establish a uniform in-
terpretation of the tax laws. Accordingly, when the courts of appeals would be in con-
flict in their interpretation of the Internal Revenue Code, the Tax Court would
not necessarily follow a conflicting court of appeals decision. But in Golsen, 54
T.C. at 757, the Tax Court reversed its stand and declared:
[Ilt is our best judgment that better judicial administration. [sic] requires us
to follow a Court of Appeals decision which is squarely in point where appeal
from our decision lies to that Court of Appeals and that court alone.
65. To make the Tax Court more accessible to the average taxpayer, Congress
established a small claims procedure whereby claims for less than $1000 could be
processed quickly without formal trial. Tax Reform Act of 1969 § 957, INT. REy.
CODE OF 1954, § 7463.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1973/iss2/3
Vol. 1973:381] RECENT LEGISLATIVE CHANGES
practice of having one executive agency-the Tax Court-sit in judg-
ment over the determinations rendered by another executive agency-
the Internal Revenue Service-and instituted the Tax Court as a judi-
cial body.,'! Congress also cloaked the Tax Court with procedural pow-
ers normally incident to article III courts. These included provisions
to allow the Tax Court to enforce its own decisions67 and punish for
contempt. ' Finally, to improve the desirability of judicial appoint-
ments, Congress provided for more uniform terms, 69 improved salary70
and tenure,71 and provided a retirement plan similar to that for other
federal judges. 72
66. See S. REP. No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 302 (1969):
Since the Tax Court has only judicial duties, the committee believes it is
anomalous to continue to classify it with quasi-judicial executive agencies that
have rule-making and investigatory functions. The status of the Tax Court
and the respect accorded to its decisions are high among those familiar with
its work. However, its constitutional status as an executive agency, no matter
how independent, raises questions in the minds of some as to whether it is
appropriate for one executive agency to be sitting in judgment on the de-
terminations of another executive agency.
67. Tax Reform Act of 1969 § 956, INT. Rnv. CoDE OF 1954, § 7456:
(d) Incidental Powers.-The Tax Court and each division thereof shall
have power to punish by fine or imprisonment, at its discretion, such con-
tempt of its authority, and none other, as-
(1) misbehavior of any person in its presence or so near thereto as to
obstruct the administration of justice;
(2) misbehavior of any of its officers in their official transaction; or
(3) disobedience or resistance to its lawful writ, process, order, rule,
decree, or command.
It shall have such assistance in the carrying out of its lawful writ, process,
order, rule, decree, or command as is available to a court of the United States.
68. Id.
69. See S. REP. No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 302-03 (1969).
70. Sce note 61 supra.
71. See note 60 supra.
72. See S. REP. No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 302 (1969); Tax Reform Act of
1969 § 954, INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 7447.
Prior to the passage of the 1969 Tax Reform Act, some had urged that the Tax
Court be made an established court of record under article 1II rather than under article
1. One possible reason for its establishment under article I may have been political
pressure from the Internal Revenue Service. Prior to the passage of the Act, one com-
mentator discussed in detail the political conflict between the Justice Department and
the Internal Revenue Service over responsibilities in Tax Court litigation. See Henke,
The Tax Court, The Proposed Administrative Court, and Judicialization, 18 BAYLOR
L. REv. 449, 465 (1966). At present, lawyers from the Internal Revenue Service
repiesent the government in trials before the Tax Court. L. KErn & D. ARGUE, TAx
COURT PRACTICE 36 (4th ed. 1970). The Internal Revenue Service may have feared
that if the Tax Court became an article III court, all tax litigation would be taken over
by the Justice Department. This question, of course, has no bearing on the status of
the Tax Court. It would be relatively simple to add a provision to the law spe-
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C. Post-1969 Decisions Regarding Tax Court Status
In a recent case, the Tax Court and the District Court for the Eastern
District of Missouri have confirmed the analysis that the Tax Court is
an article I court. In Burns, Stix Friedman & Co. v. Commissioner,73
taxpayer, alleging that any action taken by the Tax Court "would be
an exercise of judicial power which can only be exercised by a court
established under article II of the Constitution," 4 filed a motion to
halt further action in his case pending before the Tax Court. The tax-
payer argued that since the Tax Court adjudicates only cases or con-
troversies arising under the laws of the United States," Congress
has exceeded its authority by creating the Tax Court under article I
without regard to the limitations of article I. The taxpayer then
concluded that this power can be granted only to article IIl courts. 70
In answering this argument, the majority opinion stressed the jurisdic-
tional aspects of the Tax Court. The court first noted that several
prior decisions had sustained the constitutionality of the Tax Court's
predecessors, and that the Tax Reform Act of 1969 did not materially
change the basic jurisdiction of the court.77 Secondly, the court traced
the history of legislative courts from Canter to Glidden, indicating
that these courts have always heard matters susceptible of judicial
determination, and that Congress has the authority to grant judicial
cifically requiring Internal Revenue Service lawyers to represent the government before
the Tax Court as an article I court. Another possible reason for its creation under
article I may have been to continue to allow accountants to practice before the Tax
Court, since there is some doubt whether accountants can practice before an article III
court. Section 7452 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 grants accountants the
right to practice before the Tax Court. This has often been cited as the main reason
for not granting full judicial status to the Tax Court. See Henke, The Tax Court,
The Proposed Administrative Court, and Judicialization, 18 BAYLOR L. REv. 449, 465
(1966); Rembar, The Practice of Taxes, 54 CoLUM. L. Ruv. 338, 347 (1954); Note,
Procedural and Administrative Changes in the Tax Court Created by the Tax Re-
form Act of 1969, 8 HousToN L. REV. 395, 401 (1970). But since federal courts have
traditionally determined who shall be eligible to practice before them pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2071, it should be possible for the Tax Court itself to continue to allow
accountants to practice before the court. Perhaps Congress may just have desired to
maintain a closer control over the operation of the court by limiting the tenure of its
judges. See Note, Procedural and Administrative Changes in the Tax Court Created
by the Tax Reform Act of 1969, 8 HOUSTON L. REV. 395, 401 (1970).
73. 57 T.C. 392 (1971).
74. Id.
75. See note 62 supra.
76. 57 T.C. at 393.
77. Id. at 395.
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power to courts other than article III courts.78 The court, employ-
ing the Bakelite test,79 held that the matters determined by the Tax
Court are susceptible of judicial determination and yet from their na-
ture do not require it, and therefore that these matters are acceptable
for adjudication by an article I court.80 The concurring opinion merely
reasoned that since the Tax Court was constitutional before the Act,
it is constitutional after the Act since the Act had not made "unconsti-
tutional that which was valid prior thereto."8" The majority made a
weak argument in distinguishing Glidden, stating that the issue was
not whether the Tax Court could be an article I court if it were given
article III attributes, but was rather whether Congress could constitu-
tionally grant the judicial power to hear tax matters to an article I
court." Even though the issue in Glidden was not identical to the is-
sue here, the criteria laid out in Glidden could have been used effec-
tively to analyze the case. If the Glidden criteria had been used and
if the court had focused upon the limited tenure and salary provision
of the Tax Reform Act of 1969, then the same result would have
been reached, but along a more traditional case law analysis.
While litigation was pending in the Tax Court, the taxpayers had
brought a separate action against the District Internal Revenue Di-
rector, alleging that the Tax Court was an unconstitutional body as or-
ganized under the Tax Reform Act.83 The district court dismissed
this contention of the taxpayer, declaring:
The 1969 legislation changed the status of the Tax Court from "inde-
pendent agency in the Executive Branch of the Government" to a "court
of record" established under Article I of the Constitution of the United
States. Courts have long recognized the authority of Congress to es-
tablish specialized courts or courts of limited jurisdiction outside the
authority of Article HI of the Constitution.84
78. Id. The majority did not find any of the major cases on the status of legisla-
tive courts controlling because of the difference in the issues. Nevertheless, the ma-
jority found support from both Glidden and Bakelite.
79. See text accompanying note 17 supra.
80. 57 T.C. at 398.
81. Id. at 401. The concurring opinion actually employed three steps to reach
their result: first, Congress has the power to establish legislative courts; second, the
Tax Court since 1926 has been a court in all but the label placed on it by Congress;
and therefore, third, that nothing in the Tax Reform Act made unconstitutional that
which was valid before.
82. Id. at 400.
83. Stix Friedman & Co. v. Coyle, 340 F. Supp. 4 (E.D. Mo. 1972).
84. Id. at 6, 7. This decision was affirmed on appeal, 467 F.2d 474 (8th Cir.
395
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The history of the Tax Court, the Supreme Court decisions defin-
ing legislative versus constitutional courts, and the recent decisions by
the Tax Court and the federal district court indicate that the present
United States Tax Court is a legislative court established under article I
of the Constitution.
IV. THE COURTS OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
A. Pre-1970 Court Structure of the District of Columbia
Prior to the District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Pro-
cedure Act of 1970, there were two distinct court systems with over-
lapping jurisdiction in the District of Columbia. One was the federal
court system, including the United States District Court85 and the United
States Court of Appeals,8 6 and the other was the District's own judicial
system, with both trial and appellate courts.8 7
1972). In an earlier case, Toberman Grain Company v. Coyle, 326 F. Supp. 337
(E.D. Mo. 1971), the taxpayer alleged that the Tax Court was unconstitutional, but
did not ask the court to decide the constitutionality of the court.
85. In 1801, Congress established the Circuit Court of the District of Columbia
as the District's highest court. In 1863, the District Supreme Court replaced the Cir-
cuit Court as the highest tribunal. Both courts were referred to as "courts of the
United States," with their judges having lifetime tenure. Congress in 1901 provided
that the District Supreme Court "shall have and exercise the same powers and jurisdic-
tion as the other courts of the United States." It is now called the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 88, 132 (1970).
For a history of the District of Columbia courts up to 1930, see O'Donoghue v.
United States, 289 U.S. 516, 548 (1933).
86. In 1893, in accord with the nationwide establishment of federal appellate
courts, the District Court of Appeals was established, Act of Feb. 9, 1893, 27 Stat. 434,
and is now the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit,
28 U.S.C. §§ 41, 43 (1970). See H. HART & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL CoURTS AND
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 47 (2d ed. 1973).
87. The District of Columbia has always had its own independent court system
with "distinctly local jurisdiction," although these courts shared some concurrent juris-
diction with the District federal courts. The local court system consisted of three
levels. At the trial court level were the Juvenile Court, Act of Dec. 23, 1963, Pub. L.
No. 88-241, § 1, 77 Stat. 496; and Municipal Court, officially called the Court of
General Sessions, Act of Dec. 23, 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-241, § 1, 77 Stat. 487. The
Municipal Court included civil and criminal divisions, Act of Dec. 23, 1963, Pub. L.
No. 88-241, § 1, 77 Stat. 487; a small claims and conciliation branch, Act of Dec. 23,
1963, Pub. L. No. 88-241, § 1, 77 Stat. 494; a domestic relations branch, Act of
Dec. 23, 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-241, § 1, 77 Stat. 492; and a landlord and tenant
branch, Act of Dec. 23, 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-241, § 1, 77 Stat. 487 (revision notes).
At the first appellate level, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed de-
cisions of the municipal and juvenile courts and of certain administrative agencies of
the District. Act of Dec. 23, 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-241, § 1, 77 Stat. 485. At the
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The precise constitutional status of the federal courts within the Dis-
trict of Columbia had been the subject of frequent litigation. Initially,
the federal courts of the District of Columbia were termed wholly "judi-
cial,"" implying an article Ifi origin. In Federal Radio Commission v.
General Electric Co., 9 however, the Supreme Court characterized the
District of Columbia federal courts as "legislative," basing its decision
on the article 1P" grant to Congress to control the affairs of the Dis-
trict of Columbia.Y This decision was followed by O'Donoghue v.
United States,9" in which the Court held that the salaries of the fed-
eral judges of the district and appellate courts could not be diminished,
since they sat on article III courts, and, therefore, were within the pro-
tection of article III." After O'Donoghue, the federal courts for the
District of Columbia were termed "hybrids," that is, endowed with both
article I and article III characteristics. 94
Finally, in 1970, the "most comprehensive reform, of the judicial
system in the District of Columbia ever undertaken by the President
third level, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
reviewed decisions of the United States District Court and the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals, with final review to the United States Supreme Court. Act of
Dec. 23, 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-241, § 1, 77 Stat. 479.
88, See Kendall v. United States, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 623 (1838):
Here, then, is the delegation to this circuit court of the whole judicial power
in this district, and in the very language of the Constitution [art. m, §2],
which declares that the judicial power shall extend to all cases in law and
equity arising under the laws of the United States ....
89. 281 U.S. 464 (1930).
90. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 17:
To exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such District
(not exceeding ten Miles square) as may, by cession of particular States,
and the Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of the Government of the
United States ....
91. 281 U.S. 464, 468 (1930). The Court stated that "the courts of the District
of Columbia are not created under the judiciary article of the Constitution but are
legislative courts . .. .
92. 289 U.S. 516 (1933). This suit was brought by judges of the Supreme Court of
the District of Columbia and the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
(later the United States District Court and the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit) to recover salaries withheld by the Comptroller General
based on his construction of a congressional act.
93. Id. at 551.
94. See generally Hobson v. Hansen, 265 F. Supp. 902 (D.D.C. 1967); 1 J.
Moona, FEDERAL PRACTICE I 0.4 [4] (2d ed. 1972); C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK op THE
LAW oF FEDERAL COURTS §11 (2d ed. 1970).
For a critical examination of the District of Columbia court status prior to the Court
Reorganization Act, see Comment, The District of Columbia Courts: Judicial or Legis-
lative?, 58 Nw. U.L. REX,. 401 (1963).
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and Congress"95 altered the statu of all the District of Columbia
courts.9 6
B. The Effect of the District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal
Procedure Act of 1970 on D.C. Courts
Prompted by the ever-increasing rate of crime in the nation's cap-
ital and the inability of the District of Columbia's courts to handle this
volume,97 Congress passed the District of Columbia Court Reform and
Criminal Procedure Act of 1970.98 The Act is more commonly known
as the "D.C. Crime Bil" because of the controversial sections"9 on
the juvenile code,100 authority for the issuance of so-called "no-knock"
warrants, 10 1 a comprehensive wiretapping law, 0 2 and authorization for
pretrial detention in lieu of bail for certain persons charged with dan-
gerous or violent crimes.103 Title I of the Act contains the provisions
concerning the court reorganization with which we are concerned.10 4
95. See Reilly, The District of Columbia Court Reorganization Act: Appellate
Review in a Period of Transition, 30 FmD. B.J. 258 (1971).
96. The Court Reorganization Act provides for a gradual changeover to the new
system in three separate stages, the first stage commencing February 1, 1971, the sec-
ond stage on August 1, 1972, and the final stage on August 1, 1973. This note will
not examine any of the multiple features of the Court Reorganization Act dealing with
this transitional period. For a discussion of court procedure during this period of trans-
ition, see generally Kern, The District of Columbia Court Reorganization Act of
1970: A Dose of the Conventional Wisdom and a Dash of Innovation, 20 Am. U.L.
REV. 237 (1970); Reilly, District of Columbia Court Reorganization Act: Appellate
Review in a Period of Transition, 30 FED. B.J. 258 (1971); Williams, District of
Columbia Court Reorganization, 1970, 59 GEo. LJ. 477 (1971).
97. See Kern, The District of Columbia Court Reorganization Act of 1970: A Dose
of the Conventional Wisdom and a Dash of Innovation, 20 AM. U.L. REv. 237 (1970).
98. See note 1 supra.
99. The D.C. Crime Bill was greeted with cries of "repression" and "police
state" from the news media. See Wicker, In the Nation: No Sale on Preventive De-
tention, N.Y. Times, July 19, 1970, § 4, at 12, col. 4 (city ed.); N.Y. Times, July 17,
1970, § 1, at 30, col. 2 (city ed.):
A Senate-House conference committee has reported out an anti-crime bill for
the District of Columbia which has been variously characterized as violative
of no less than five constitutional amendments and as a blueprint for a police
state ..
See also Schwartz, S. 30: "The Seeds of Repression," 211 THE NATION 70 (1970).
100. D.C. CoDa ANN. §§ 16-2301 to -2337 (Supp. V, 1972).
101. D.C. CoDE ANN. § 23-591 (Supp. V, 1972).
102. D.C. CoDa ANN. §§ 23-541 to -556 (Supp. V, 1972).
103. D.C. CoDE ANN. §§ 23-1321 to -1332 (Supp. V, 1972).
104. See generally Williams, District of Columbia Court Reorganization, 1970, 59
Gao. LI. 477 (1971). Mr. Williams was intimately acquainted with the development
of the congressional conference bill and the entire 17-month legislative process that
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The intent of Congress in passing the bill was to eliminate any local
jurisdiction from the United States District Court and the United States
Court of Appeals and to transfer all jurisdiction over local matters to a
"largely independent local court system."' 5  This is evidenced by sec-
tion 111 of the Court Reorganization Act, which declares:
The judicial power in the District of Columbia is vested in the following
courts:
(1) The following Federal Courts established pursuant to Article m
of the Constitution:
(A) the Supreme Court of the United States
(B) the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit
(C) the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.
(2) The following District of Columbia courts established pursuant to
article I of the Constitution:
(A) the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
(B) the Superior Court of the District of Columbia.106
Under the Court Reorganization Act, the United States District Court
and United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia are no
different than any other article Il court.10 7  Thus, the jurisdiction
once exercised by the District's federal courts over local civil and crimi-
nal matters will now be transferred to a new court system.'08 The
Act declares that the District of Columbia Court of Appeals shall be the
"highest court of the District of Columbia" with appeal directly 0 9 to
the United States Supreme Court rather than to the United States Court
went into the bill. In addition to discussing each section of the bill, Mr. Williams
includes many citations to the congressional hearings and reports on the bill.
105. Bland v. Rodgers, 332 F. Supp. 989, 991 (D.D.C. 1971); Williams, supra
note 96, at 533; S. REP. No. 91-405, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 4, 18 (1969); H. REP. No.
91-907. 91st Cong., 2nd Sess. 23, 34, 35 (1970).
106. D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-101 (Supp. V, 1972).
107. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 11-301, -501 to -503 (Supp. V, 1972). The jurisdiction
of the District of Columbia federal courts will henceforth be limited to diversity of
citizenship actions and federal questions, which excludes interpretation of District of
Columbia statutes. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332 (1970); Court Reorganization Act §
172(c)(1), 84 Stat. at 590, amending 28 U.S.C. § 1363 (1970). In Palmore v. United
States, 290 A.2d 573 (Ct. App. D.C. 1972), prob. juris. noted, 409 U.S. 840 (1972),
the court rejected defendant's contention that the violation of District of Columbia
criminal laws, although laws passed by Congress, were cases arising under the laws
of the United States and hence "federal questions." 290 A.2d at 578.
108. See note 105 supra.
109. D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-102 (Supp. V, 1972).
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of Appeals for the District of Columbia as was the situation previously. 110
The trial level court system in the District will be the Superior Court
of the District of Columbia. 1 '
Although the Act will have the direct impact of increasing the finan-
cial and durational attractiveness of the bench of the District local
courts,"' the Court Reorganization Act does not confer the same guar-
antee against undiminished salary and lifetime tenure as the Constitu-
tion affords judges of the federal "constitutional" courts."13  The Act
does, however, make significant strides towards improving the ac-
countability 1 4 and productivity of the District of Columbia courts.",,
110. Act of Dec. 23, 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-241, § 1, 77 Stat. 479. While this tech-
nically places the District of Columbia Court of Appeals on the same level as the
various state supreme courts, there are a number of notable deviations from Supreme
Court review of state supreme court decisions and from the stare decisis effect of
state court decisions. See generally Williams, supra note 104, at 492-500. One ex-
ample of this is that the Supreme Court retains authority to interpret the meaning of
statutes applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia along with all other statutes
of the United States, while the individual state supreme courts interpret the meaning
of their own state statutes. Court Reorganization Act § 172(a)(1), 84 Stat. at 590,
amending 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1970). Another example is that, while a decision of
the District of Columbia Court of Appeals holding a District of Columbia statute
invalid may be reviewed by appeal to the Supreme Court, a decision of the supreme
court of a state holding a state statute to be constitutionally invalid would be reviewable
in the Supreme Court of the United States only by writ of certiorari. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1257(1)(3) (1970).
111. D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-101, -901, -902 (Supp. V, 1972). This court reflects a
consolidation of the numerous local trial courts and the transfer of local jurisdiction
away from the federal district court. Compare D.C. CoDE ANN. H§ 11-501 to -503,
11-921 to -923 (Supp. V, 1972), with Act of Dec. 23, 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-241, § 1,
77 Stat. 482, 483. The Superior Court will have a Civil Division, Criminal Division,
Family Division, Probate Division, and Tax Division.
112. See Williams, note 104 supra, at 517. To enhance the attractiveness of ap-
pointment to the local bench, the term of office was increased from ten to fifteen
years, retirement benefits were increased. The salaries of the District of Columbia
judges are tied to the salaries of federal judges. Superior Court judges receive ninety
percent of the salary of federal district judges and Court of Appeals judges receive a
similar proportion of the salary of federal circuit judges. D.C. CODE ANN. H9 11-703
(b), -904(b), -502, -1561 to -1571, -195(a) to (c) (Supp. V, 1972).
113. See note 32 supra and accompanying text.
114. To improve accountability, filing of financial statements are required, resi-
dency requirements are provided for the choosing of judges, and a removal commission
is established with broad powers to remove judges for reasons in addition to those
required for removal of judges of article III courts. See generally Williams, supra
note 104, at 511-26. D.C. CoDE ANN. H§ 11-1501, -1521 to -1530 (Supp. V, 1972).
115. To better monitor judicial productivity, provisions were added to require addi-
tional reports on the operation of the court, to reduce vacation, and to create a court
administrative office. D.C. CoDE ANN. §§ 11-709, -909, -1505, -1701 to -1747 (Supp.
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Given this outline of the Court Reorganization Act, an application
of the Glidden standards"' would appear to indicate that the United
States District Court and United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia are exclusively "constitutional" courts'17 and that the
two local courts of the District of Columbia are "legislative." The pri-
mary considerations directing this conclusion are the limited salary and
tenure provisions for the two local courts and the expression of con-
gressional intent. A direct effect of this reorganization will be to end
the hybrid status of the United States District Court and United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia."" Presumably, these
courts will now be limited solely to the adjudication of cases and con-
troversies.
C. Post Court Reorganization Act Decisions Regarding Court Status
Since the passage of the Court Reorganization Act, two decisions
have upheld the constitutionality of the new court system. In Bland
v. Rogers" ' the United States District Court for the District of Colum-
bia dealt with a constitutional challenge to the limitation of judicial re-
view of habeas corpus actions to the local courts of the District. The
court, relying upon congressional intent, upheld the divestiture of such
actions from the federal courts of the District.' 20 Presumably, this
V, 1972 . See also Kern, The District of Columbia Court Reorganization Act of
1970: A Dose of the Conventional Wisdom and A Dash of Innovation, 20 AM. U.L.
RE,. 237, 243-51 (1970). Williams, supra note 104, at 526-32.
116. Sce notes 29-32 supra and accompanying text.
117. Even prior to the Act, Professor Wright felt that, though the D.C. federal
courts \&ere theoretically "hybrid," for all practical purposes they were "constitutional."
C, WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF FEDERAL COURTS § 11 (2d ed. 1970).
118. Prior to the Court Reorganization Act, the D.C. federal courts performed
some duties not allowed other federal courts. See note 37 supra. Although prior to
the Act, the District federal courts could hear such matters as probate and divorce,
these matters are still considered to be cases and controversies under the Constitution
and could be heard by all federal courts if the federal courts desired to hear such
matter,. Sce C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 25 (2d ed.
1970). As a further example the District Court for the District of Columbia upheld
its right to appoint members of the local board of education in Hobson v. Hansen,
265 F. Supp. 902 (D.D.C. 1967), basing its authority on the "hybrid" nature of the
court.
119. 332 F. Supp. 989 (D.D.C. 1971). Bland involved a habeas corpus suit of a 16
year old inxolved in a postal robbery, detained as an adult under the Criminal Proced-
ure Act. The suit was originally filed in the Superior Court but was removed to the
United States District Court.
120. Id. at 991:
This court recognizes the overriding intent of Congress to create a largely
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holding will be extended beyond habeas corpus actions.
In the second case, Palmore v. United States,1 2' the defendant at-
tacked the constitutional fabric of the Superior Court of the District
of Columbia. Defendant argued that his suit was within the ambit of
article 1H because the applicable District of Columbia statute under
which he had been convicted was within the "laws of the United
States," thus creating a federal question, and because the United States
was a party to the action. 122  Therefore, he asserted, once a case or
controversy was within "the judicial power of the United States" as de-
fined in article 1H, Congress cannot constitutionally confer jurisdic-
tion of that case upon a non-article HI court.' 28  The court rejected de-
fendant's argument that Congress must vest jurisdiction over local felo-
nies only in article III courts, relying upon the inherent plenary pow-
ers of Congress under article I. The court indicated that the District
clause in the Constitution, article I, section 8, clause 17, has been used
in the past in a dual fashion to broaden the traditional boundaries of
article I regarding the judicial powers of the District of Columbia
courts. Congress, by vesting article I subject matter in the federal con-
stitutional courts of the District, has given these courts jurisdiction
beyond the traditional article HI limitation of "case or controversy. "124
In addition, Congress has employed the District clause to allow article
I judges to hear and determine subject matter which is within the
ambit of article III, such as local misdemeanors and local felo-
nies.'2 5 Because the Court of Appeals recognized these two possi-
independent local court system as well as their concern for "orderliness" which
underlies the customary deference accorded to the local administration of
local matters.
The federal court allowed the petition for habeas corpus in this case since the Su-
perior Court had denied relief "without prejudice to its being filed in the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia." Id. at 990.
121. 290 A.2d 573 (Ct. App. D.C. 1972), prob. juris. noted, 409 U.S. 840 (1972).
The defendant had been convicted in Superior Court of carrying a dangerous weapon
after a prior felony conviction. This conviction was affirmed by the Court of Ap-
peals.
122. Id. at 575. The defendant's theory as to "federal question" jurisdiction appears
to be answered in the Court Reorganization Act. See note 107 supra. The de-
fendant's theory as to the effect of the United States being a party would appear to be
fallacious, since the Court of Claims and Tax Court were at one time or another
article I courts in which the United States was usually a party to the suit.
123. 290 A.2d at 575.
124. See note 94 supra (hybrid court).
125. Cf. note 62 supra (Tax Court).
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bilities, that is, article I courts vested with article Ii subject matter and
article IH courts vested with non-article III subject matter, it concluded
that Congress could constitutionally grant a species of judicial power
to the District's courts free of the limitations in article II.126  If the
defendant's contention had been accepted, the upshot would have
been to limit severely the adjudicatory power of article I courts such as
the Tax Court and the Court of Military Appeals.' 2 7 The court's argu-
ment is weakened, however, by its reliance on the constitutionality of
the past hybrid status of the District federal courts because the Court
Reorganization Act, indicating congressional intention, directly at-
tempts to terminate that hybrid status.'
Defendant's second argument was that "in the District of Columbia,
Congress, at least since 1863, has conferred jurisdiction over local
felonies in article IH courts and therefore it cannot now be permitted
to withdraw that jurisdiction from these courts and vest it in an article
I court system."' ' 9 The resolution of the defendant's argument de-
pended upon a determination of which article of the Constitution gave
the courts of the District of Columbia their jurisdiction over local felo-
nies and misdemeanors. 3 ' The court first looked to the historical rec-
ord to ascertain congressional intent and found the record silent.' 31 To
resolve the issue, the court was persuaded that:
126. Id. at 576. The court also recognized that there are some excellent reasons to
designate all District of Columbia courts as article III courts:
There may be, of course, substantial and persuasive reasons for creating all
courts in the District with lifetime tenure and undiminishable salary for judges
so as to be completely free of possible legislative influence. See generally
O'Donoghue v. United States. . . . However, Congress has chosen in its
legislative wisdom to follow the example of numerous states [46] which do
not provide for such tenure or salary, and we find this choice to be a legiti-
mate means by which Congress may accomplish the permissible end of creat-
ing a "local" court system under the District Clause.
Id. at 578.
127. For example, if all jurisdiction involving cases arising under the laws of the
United States or cases to which the "United States is a party" were divested from the
Tax Court. then the Tax Court would have very few cases to hear and the burden of
these divested cases would be placed upon the United States District Court or Court
of Claims. Sec note 62 supra.
128. See note 118 supra and accompanying text.
129. 290 A.2d at 578. One argument evidently not made by the defendant is that
the divesting of criminal jurisdiction from the federal court was the divesting of de-
fendant's right to have his case tried in federal court and was therefore a denial of
due process of law.
130. The test to which the court looks here is the Bakelite test. See text accom-
panying note 18 supra.
131. 290 A.2d at 578.
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By virtue of the restricted locale of the conduct proscribed by the first
District of Columbia Code, the fact that inferior article III courts
throughout the several states are incapable of receiving jurisdiction over
purely local offenses and the general reluctance in the early days of our
nation's history to expand the article III judicial power, Congress con-
veyed the judicial power over District of Columbia felonies to the courts
in the District under the District clause.13 2
Whether or not this argument is persuasive is not essential to the hold-
ing, for the court noted that even if jurisdiction had been vested un-
der article III rather than under the District clause, Congress, recog-
nizing the history of legislative courts, could constitutionally divest that
jurisdiction from article III courts.' 33 Based on this reasoning, the
court rejected defendant's historical argument. Therefore, if the Court
Reorganization Act withstands constitutional attack, the effect will be
that "if the conduct violates a local statute, a local court has juris-
diction to hear and determine their case, if the conduct violates a
general federal statute, an article Im federal court will have jurisdic-
tion."' 34 This effect will make the District local courts similar to the
judiciary existing in each individual state.'35
132. Id. at 579 (emphasis original).
133. Id. at 580.
134. Id. The Bland and Palmore decisions dealt with criminal proceedings, the
area in which the effect of court reorganization is greatest. Prior to the Act, concur-
rent jurisdiction over criminal matters existed in both federal and District local
courts, often resulting in delays in the disposition of criminal matters. The House
District Committee in March of 1970 complained:
Mhe fact is that the diversity of Federal and local interest [in the District of
Columbia] has led to the jurisdictional disarray which presently exists-the
local court handles some federal misdemeanors, the Federal Court has
jurisdiction of local felonies and concurrent jurisdiction over local misde-
meanors, the local court makes determinations as to certain administrative
procedures appeals, the Federal court hears others without apparent distinc-
tion as to local-Federal interest; the Federal court tries cases that would else-
where be within the state system. And then there is the overall problem of
concurrent jurisdiction, producing delays in the disposition of criminal matters,
described as "ping-pong," in derogation of the public and federal interest.
H.R. REP. No. 907, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 33 (1970). Under the Act, most of the crim-
inal cases that had been heard in federal courts must now be brought only in District
local courts, and the federal courts will hear only those criminal matters that may be
brought in other similar federal courts. See notes 107 and 108 supra.
135. 290 A.2d at 580, where the court stated:
What Congress has done by enacting the 1970 Court Reform Act is to treat
criminal offenders in the District of Columbia as they would be treated in
any state.
The court also indicates that, since 46 states do not require judges who hear local
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1973/iss2/3
Vol. 1973:381] RECENT LEGISLATIVE CHANGES
V. CONCLUSION
A key policy and legal issue to be considered is whether the Tax Court
and the District of Columbia local courts should be article 1H, rather
than article I, courts.
A. The Tax Court
Despite the reasons advanced for the designation of the Tax Court as
an article I court," 6 there are important policy considerations support-
ing the proposition that the Tax Court should be established as an ar-
ticle III court. One reason lies in the concept of separation of pow-
ers."" The primary factor for removing the Tax Court from the leg-
islative or executive branches would be to establish a truly indepen-
dent judiciary. Without lifetime tenure and undiminishable salary the
judiciary cannot, in theory, be totally independent. 3 ' This lack of
"theoretical" independence, although subtle, leaves nagging doubts in
the minds of some as to the impartiality of the court. Such doubts
cannot possibly be eliminated until the Tax Court becomes separate and
independent."" A parallel aspect of this independence is that grant-
ing article Ill status to the Tax Court would increase respect for it as a
judicial institution. Additionally, as an article i court the Tax Court
would be administered under the Office of the United States Courts, which
would handle all appropriations and secure courtrooms for the Tax
felonies to have lifetime tenure, the District of Columbia local courts are not peculiar.
Id. at 578 n.12.
The court in Palmore also felt compelled to accept the distinction employed in
O'Donoghue between territorial courts and the District of Columbia courts. Id. at 576.
Nevertheless, the court cited with apparent approval arguments by the Government
that the District of Columbia local courts are similar to the old territorial courts, in
that the District may become a state or at least obtain sufficient home rule so as to
become capable of creating its own judicial system and would not have the need for
large numbers of lifetime article III judges, whose principle function had been to adjudi-
cate local matters. Id. at 576 n.5. The Supreme Court in a recent decision where
the issue was whether the District of Columbia could be considered a "state" or
"territory" pursuant to an alleged violation of § 1983 of the Civil Rights Act ap-
pears to have rejected the theory that the District of Columbia has a status analogous
to a territory or a state. District of Columbia v. Carter, 93 S. Ct. 602 (1973).
136. See note 72 supra.
137. One commentator makes a strong argument that without article III status the
Tax Court violates the separation of powers concept and is therefore unconstitutional.
See Ginsberg, Is the Tax Court Constitutional?, 35 MIss. L.J. 382 (1964).
138. See note 32 supra.
139. See note 66 supra.
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Court across the nation.140  Finally, the Federal Rules of Civil Proced-
ure and Evidence would then be used by the Tax Court, greatly increas-
ing the discovery possibilities.' 4 '
B. The District of Columbia Courts
Although there are cogent reasons supporting the designation of
the District local judges as judges of article I courts, 42 there is at least
one important policy consideration in support of the argument that the
District of Columbia local judges should be granted article I protec-
tion-the separation of powers doctrine. In O'Donoghue the Supreme
Court voiced the fear that Congress might unduly influence the courts of
the District if the judges were not granted constitutional status:
Indeed, the reasons . . . which impelled the adoption of the constitu-
tional limitation [lifetime tenure and undiminishable salary], apply with
even greater force to the courts of the District than to the inferior courts
of the United States located elsewhere, because the judges of the former
courts are in closer contact with, and more immediately open to the in-
fluences of the legislative department, and exercise a more extensive
jurisdiction in cases affecting the operations of the general government
and its various departments.' 43
The separation of powers doctrine should apply equally to judges of
the District local courts as it does to judges of the District federal courts,
since both court systems receive their laws from Congress and both
would be subjected to congressional pressures.
Based on the necessity to maintain an independent judiciary, Con-
gress should re-evaluate the status of the Tax Court and the local courts
of the District of Columbia and grant these courts article HI status.
140. See Henke, The Tax Court, The Proposed Administrative Court, and Judicial-
ization, 18 BAYLOR L. REv. 449, 467 (1966).
141. At present the discovery rules for the Tax Court are not as broad as those in
other federal courts. See Kominsky, The Case for Discovery Procedure in the Tax
Court, 36 TAXES 498 (1958); Note, Procedural and Administrative Changes in the
Tax Court Created by the Tax Reform Act of 1969, 8 HousToN L. REv. 395, 399
(1970). But since the Tax Court may adopt its own rules of procedure, INT. REv.
CODE OF 1954, § 7453, it would not be necessary to achieve article III status in order
to change the discovery rules.
142. See note 126 supra. Another reason for designation under article I may have
been that Congress desired to retain more control over the District of Columbia
judiciary by limiting the tenure of its judges. See Williams, supra note 96, at 490.
143. O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516, 535 (1932).
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